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For those outside the practice of law, the term "on the mer-
its" has little significance. However, the very mention of the
phrase haunts those who have taken a first-year Civil Proce-
dure course with memories of res judicata. Although determin-
ing which judgments qualify as "on the merits" may be
deceptively simple at first blush, many students spend a good
part of the semester chasing this elusive concept. While frus-
trating to first-year law students, the precise definition of "on
the merits" has even escaped the grasp of legal scholars.1
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a prior valid final judg-
ment may bar parties to a previous action from re-filing the
same claim at another time or in another court.2 However, in
order for a judgment to be given claim-preclusive effect, it must
be classified as an adjudication upon the merits.3 This distinc-
tion ensures that only cases reaching the substantive merits of
the parties' claims are given claim-preclusive effect. 4 Because it
is difficult to ascertain whether or not a judgment is "on the
merits," questions arise when courts seek to determine whether
actions before them between similar parties are barred by res
judicata.
Until recently, one of the easiest categories of judgments to
classify as being "on the merits" was a dismissal of a claim by a
federal district court. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure di-
rectly address such a dismissal: "Unless the court in its order
1. Some publications have chosen to avoid using the term altogether. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. a (1982) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]
("Although [judgments entitled to preclusive effect] are often described as 'on the
merits' or as 'operating as an adjudication on the merits,' that terminology is not
used here in the statement of the general rule because of its possibly misleading
connotations.") (emphasis added).
2. See id. § 17.
3. Along with finality and validity, a decision on the merits is required for a
prior judgment to have claim preclusive effect. See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 351, 352 (1876) ("[A valid, final] judgment, if rendered upon
the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action.") (emphasis added);
see also Jay C. Carlisle, Second Circuit 1999-2000 Res Judicata Developments, 20
QuINNmPmAc L. REV. 75, 75 n.2 (2000) ("After a final judgment on the merits ren-
dered by a court of competent jurisdiction, res judicata bars subsequent litigation
between the same parties and those in privity with them involving the same cause
of action.") (citation omitted).
4. See County of Sac, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) at 352.
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for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal . . .other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for fail-
ure to join a party under Rule 19... operates as an adjudication
on the merits."5 Rule 41(b) created a default rule: Unless the
dismissal order specifically stated otherwise, or fell into one of
the three listed categories, the dismissal would be considered
"on the merits." Naturally, one would logically conclude such a
dismissal under Rule 41(b) would be given claim-preclusive ef-
fect. That was the case until February 2001, when the Supreme
Court decided Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp.6
In Semtek, the Court granted certiorari to determine the
claim-preclusive effect of a federal court dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds. Semtek, the plaintiff in the action, origi-
nally filed suit on breach of contract and business tort theories
in California state court.7 Lockheed removed to federal court on
diversity of citizenship grounds and moved to dismiss because
California's two-year statute of limitations barred the suit.8
The district court granted the motion and dismissed Semtek's
claims "in [their] entirety on the merits and with prejudice."9
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismis-
sal.10 Semtek then re-filed the suit in Maryland state court,
where the Maryland three-year statute of limitations allowed
the claims.'1 Lockheed, a Maryland corporation, removed to
federal district court on federal question grounds, claiming the
dismissal of the action by the California federal court barred the
current action under both the doctrine of res judicata and Rule
41(b). 12 The federal district court declined jurisdiction and re-
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 19 cmt. b.
6. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
7. Id. at 499.
8. Id.
9. Id. The statute of limitations dismissal was considered "on the merits" for
two reasons. First, it fell within the default rule of Rule 41(b) because it was not a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party. Sec-
ond, the federal district court specifically stated the dismissal was "with prejudice"
and "on the merits." Standing alone, either would create a claim-preclusive dis-
missal under Rule 41(b). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
10. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 500.
315
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manded the action back to the Maryland state court.13 Lock-
heed's request to the California federal district court for
injunctive relief was also fruitless. 14
Citing Rule 41(b), Lockheed successfully moved the Mary-
land state court for dismissal on grounds of res judicata. 5
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit rejected Semtek's appeal
to amend the California federal court order to remove the "on
the merits" and "with prejudice" distinctions.' 6 After reem-
phasizing the clear language of Rule 41(b), the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court decision, holding
"[tihe earlier dismissal of the suit by the [California federal dis-
trict court] was a judgment on the merits and was entitled to
the preclusive effect that [the trial judge] gave [to] it."' 7 Semtek
appealed.
13. Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 988 F. Supp. 913, 914 (D. Md.
1997). Generally speaking, for a federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), a federal question must be a
necessary element of the plaintiffs complaint. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Here, federal question jurisdiction did not exist
because the federal issue (the claim-preclusive effect of a federal diversity dismis-
sal) was not a necessary element of Semtek's complaint-it arose only as an af-
firmative defense by Lockheed.
14. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499-500.
15. Id. at 500. See also Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 736 A.2d
1104, 1107 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (reporting the language of the Maryland trial
court: "The central issue that this court has been asked to consider is the preclu-
sive effect of a federal dismissal on a subsequent identical state court action. ...
Pursuant to the clear language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... federal
law determines the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment.").
16. Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 97-55840, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3150 (9th Cir. 1999). Even if the Ninth Circuit had granted Semtek's mo-
tion, it is unclear whether that alone would have surmounted Lockheed's res judi-
cata defense to the current action in Maryland state court. The clear language of
Rule 41(b) would still qualify the original California federal court decision as "on
the merits."
17. Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 736 A.2d 1104, 1121 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1999), cert. denied, 742 A.2d 521 (Md. 1999).
316
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Relying on the Erie doctrine,' 8 a unanimous Supreme Court
rejected the plain meaning of Rule 41(b). 19 Semtek argued Rule
41(b) should be construed consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Dupasseur v. Rochereau,20 which required "that the
res judicata effect of a federal diversity judgment 'is such as
would belong to judgments of the State courts rendered under
similar circumstances."' 21 Under California law, dismissal on
statute of limitations grounds would not bar filing the identical
action in a different state where the limitations period had not
yet expired. 22 Therefore, adoption of the Dupasseur rule would
strip the original dismissal of Semtek's claims of its claim-
preclusive effect, allowing the current action in the Maryland
state court to proceed.
The Court rejected Semtek's claim that Dupasseur was con-
trolling because it was decided under the since-repealed Con-
formity Act of 1872,23 requiring federal courts to use state
18. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution of by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern."). Erie and its progeny comprise what is popularly
known as the Erie Doctrine. The Erie doctrine is discussed in notes 39 to 57, infra,
and accompanying text.
19. Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 531 U.S. 497, 501-04 (2001)
("Implicit ... is the unstated minor premise that all judgments denominated 'on
the merits' are entitled to claim-preclusive effect. That premise is not necessarily
valid .... Moreover, as so interpreted, the Rule would in many cases violate the
federalism principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . .by engendering 'substantial
variations [in outcomes] between state and federal litigation' which would 'l] ikely
... influence the choice of a forum."') (citations omitted).
20. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1874).
21. Brief for the petitioner at 8, Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin, 531
U.S. 497 (2001) (No. 99-1551) (citation omitted).
22. See, e.g., Koch v. Rodlin Enter., 273 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding dismissal of an action on statute of limitations grounds does not preclude
subsequent actions under California law on res judicata); see also 40 CAL. JUR. 3D
Judgments § 131 (1995) ("A summary judgment granted on grounds that are not
on the merits, such as that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, does
not act as res judicata.").
23. 17 Stat. 196 § 5 (1872) ("That the practice, pleadings, and forms and
modes of proceeding in other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and
district courts of the United States shall conform, as near as may be, to the prac-
tice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like
causes in the courts of record in the State within which such circuit or district
courts are held ....").
5
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procedural rules in nonequity cases.24 The Court had decided
over one hundred years of choice-of-law decisions since Con-
gress passed the Conformity Act. Most notably, Erie and its
progeny forever changed the way federal courts make choice-of-
law decisions. However, the Semtek Court upheld the rule of
Dupasseur by creating federal common law to reach the same
result:
In other words, in Dupasseur the State was allowed (indeed,
required) to give a federal diversity judgment no more effect than
it would accord one of its own judgments only because reference to
state law was the federal rule that this Court deemed appropriate.
In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect
of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity.
It is left to us, then, to determine the appropriate federal rule.
And despite the sea change that has occurred in the background
law since Dupasseur was decided-not only [the] repeal of the
Conformity Act but also the watershed decision of this Court in
Erie-we think the result decreed by Dupasseur continues to be
correct for diversity cases.25
Since the Erie decision in 1938, the Supreme Court has de-
cided numerous cases either approving or rejecting the use of
federal common law. 26 A study of the Semtek decision provides
a vehicle through which modern jurists can examine the vitality
of federal common law with an eye towards its underlying policy
considerations. To that end, this article critically examines the
Semtek decision within the realm of the Supreme Court's fed-
eral common law jurisprudence. Section II gives an historical
overview of federal common law, noting the many policy consid-
erations that factor into its creation. 27 Section III discusses
tests and factors the Court has previously enunciated in deter-
mining whether or not to create federal common law.28 Finally,
Section IV attempts to reconcile Semtek with the aforemen-
24. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500-01.
25. Id. at 508 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
26. See, e.g., Semtek; Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213 (1997);
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); United States v. Kimbell Foods,
440 U.S. 715 (1979); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v.
Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
27. See infra notes 30-94 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 95-133 and accompanying text.
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tioned tests and factors. 29 Because the Semtek Court departs
from its most recent federal common law jurisprudence, Section
IV also evaluates whether the Court has returned to less strin-
gent standards for the enactment of federal common law.
II. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND
THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INHERENT IN
ITS CREATION
Common law is defined as "[tihe body of law derived from
judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions."30
Federal common law involves the common law created by fed-
eral courts. 31 Federal common law differs greatly from tradi-
tional notions of common law because a federal court's creation
of common law raises both federalism and separation of powers
concerns. Aside from the concerns accompanying the creation
of federal law absent Congressional act, the application of fed-
eral common law to areas outside the scope of federal authority
infringes upon the law-making authority of the several states.
Because of these competing concerns, the history of federal com-
mon law is replete with policy considerations weighing federal
courts' power to create common law against concerns of federal-
ism and separation of powers.
These dual concerns are also evident when examining Con-
gress' administration of the inferior federal courts. Pursuant to
its power to establish inferior federal courts, 32 Congress enacted
the Judiciary Act of 1789;33 section 34 of which contained the
Rules of Decision Act. The Rules of Decision Act required that
federal courts apply the substantive law of the several states
unless they were otherwise directed by Congress.34
29. See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
30. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 270 (7th ed. 1999).
31. See id.
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (giv-
ing Congress the power to "constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court").
33. 1 Stat. 73 § 35 (1789). For the history and legislative intent of the Judici-
ary Act on 1789, see generally WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING
NEW EVIDENCE (1990).
34. See 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). The principles of the Rules of Decision Act are
still codified in the United States Code. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2001) ("The laws of
319
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In 1842, the Supreme Court held in Swift v. Tyson 35 that
the Rules of Decision Act did not preclude federal courts from
creating common law in areas even outside the federal area of
competence. The Court found the Act was limited to statutory
law, and, therefore, did not include common law created by
state courts. 36 After Swift, federal courts had broad power to
create what would later come to be known as "general law" or
"general federal common law" in addition to their common law-
making powers. General law differed from federal common law
because, although both were created by federal courts, general
law referred to common law outside the scope of federal compe-
tence.37 Aside from the federalism principles discussed below,
application of the general law proved troublesome on many
grounds. Essentially, some courts viewed the general law as a
third body of law; a decision made by a federal court invoking
the general law was not necessarily decided upon federal law.38
the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or
Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion in civil actions in courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.").
35. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
36. Id. at 18-19.
37. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1938) (describing
the far reach of the federal general common law):
The discrimination resulting became in practice far-reaching. This re-
sulted in part from the broad province accorded to the so-called "general
law" as to which federal courts exercised an independent judgment. In addi-
tion to questions of purely commercial law, "general law" was held to include
the obligations under contracts entered into and to be performed within the
State, the extent to which a carrier operating within a State may stipulate
for exemption from liability for his own negligence or that of his employee;
the liability for torts committed within the State upon persons resident or
property located there, even where the question of liability depended upon
the scope of a property right conferred by the State; and the right to exem-
plary or punitive damages. Furthermore, state decisions construing local
deeds, mineral conveyances, and even devises of real estate were
disregarded.
38. For example, when the Supreme Court evaluated certiorari petitions from
state court decisions for independent federal grounds of decision, it refused to hear
cases decided upon an independent ground of either state or general law. Before
Erie was decided in 1938, the Supreme Court noted this distinction by refusing
appellate review to state cases decided upon independent, "non-federal" grounds.
See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) ("[Wlhere the judg-
ment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is indepen-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/7
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A. Federalism Concerns and the Erie Decision
After Swift, the scope of federal common law was broad and
far-reaching, going significantly beyond the Constitutional
scope of federal powers. 39 Federal courts created common law
in areas in which Congress lacked authority to enact statutory
law. 40 Under Swift, there was no longer parity between a forum
state's courts and a federal court sitting in diversity within that
forum state.41 Whether state or federal substantive law applied
to a decision depended on where the plaintiff filed the case:
"Before Erie,... suing in a state court usually meant that state
law would apply to key issues in a case and suing in federal
court meant that federal common law would apply, choice of fo-
rum was often equivalent to choice of result."42
Perhaps the most often cited illustration of this lack of par-
ity is Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co. 43 In Black & White, two Kentucky-
based taxi companies disputed over exclusive rights to pick up
passengers at a railroad station in Bowling Green, Kentucky.44
Brown & Yellow, which had an exclusive contract with the rail-
road company to pick up passengers at the station, claimed
Black & White was infringing upon their exclusive right to do so
by competing for passengers at the station.45 Brown & Yellow
reincorporated as a Tennessee corporation to create diversity
jurisdiction and sued in federal courts.46 This allowed Brown &
Yellow to avoid unfavorable Kentucky law, which would not en-
dent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.") (emphasis
added).
39. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 76.
40. See id. at 72 ("The federal courts assumed, in the broad field of 'general
law,' the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly with-
out power to enact as statutes."). Congressional areas of competence are enumer-
ated in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
41. Parity refers to the theory that a case filed in a federal district court sit-
ting in diversity should reach the same outcome as an identical case filed in the
state court. For an overview of parity and the policy concerns that drive it, see
DONALD L. DOERNBERG & C. KEITH WINGATE, FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS 13-21 (2d ed. 2000).
42. Id. at 14.
43. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
44. Id. at 522-33.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 523-24.
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force their contract with the railroad, in favor of the general fed-
eral common law, which would enforce their contract:
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held such contracts inva-
lid .... The question there decided is one of general law. [The
Supreme] Court holds such contracts valid. And these decisions
show that, without its consent, the property of a railroad company
may not be used by taxicabmen or others to solicit or carry on
their business and that it is beyond the power of the State in the
public interest to require the railroad company without compen-
sation to allow its property so to be used.47
Justice Holmes dissented in Black & White, arguing that
federal courts should be bound by state common law within the
scope of the Rules of Decision Act. 48 Even prior to Black &
White, Justice Field highlighted the flaws in the general federal
common law system in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh:49
I admit that learned judges have fallen into the habit of re-
peating this doctrine as a convenient mode of brushing aside the
law of a State in conflict with their views. And I confess that,
moved and governed by the authority of the great names of those
judges, I have, myself, in many instances, unhesitatingly and con-
fidently, but I think now erroneously repeated the same doctrine.
But, notwithstanding the great names which may be cited in
favor of the doctrine, and notwithstanding the frequency with
47. Id. at 526-27 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
48. Black & White, 276 U.S. at 533-34 (Holmes, J. dissenting):
Therefore I think it proper to state what I think the fallacy is. -The
often repeated proposition of this and the lower Courts is that the parties
are entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law. By that
phrase is meant matters that are not governed by any law of the United
States or by any statute of the State-matters that in States other than
Louisiana are governed in most respects by what is called the common law.
It is through this phrase that what I think the fallacy comes in.
... If there were such a transcendental body of law outside of any par-
ticular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute,
the Courts of the United States might be right in using their independent
judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and
illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside
thing to be found. Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in
the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some defi-
nite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State,
whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the
law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to
what it may have been in England or anywhere else.
49. 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
322 [Vol. 23:313
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which the doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a perpet-
ual protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United
States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and inde-
pendence of the States-independence in their legislative and in-
dependence in their judicial departments. Supervision over either
the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case per-
missible except as to matters by the Constitution specially au-
thorized or delegated to the United States.50
Justice Brandeis, who joined the Black & White dissent, cited
the case with disfavor ten years later in Erie as one of the
problems with general federal common law. 51
In 1938, the Court adopted Justice Holmes' interpretation
in Erie. Before overruling Swift v. Tyson, the Erie court reinter-
preted the Rules of Decision Act to include common law created
by the courts of the several states:
[T]he purpose of the section was merely to make certain that,
in all matters except those in which some federal law is control-
ling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citi-
zenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the
State, unwritten as well as written.52
With the Rules of Decision Act freshly construed to include
state common law, only questions of supremacy remained.
"[Wlhere the Constitution, or a valid Act of Congress, provides a
rule of decision, it must be applied by a federal court . . .,53
With Erie, the Court found that declaring rules of general com-
mon law was beyond the scope of their Constitutional power:54
"There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a State . . . be they commercial law or part of the law of torts.
50. Id. at 401 (Field, J. dissenting).
51. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1938).
52. Id. at 72-73 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Fed-
eral Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923)). But see RITZ, supra note
33, at 148 (arguing that Congress intended the Rules of Decision Act to be a tempo-
rary measure to allow federal courts to adjudicate without first developing uniform
rules of procedure).
53. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 412 (5th ed. 1994). A
discussion of what constitutes a valid act of Congress could fill numerous volumes
and is beyond the scope of this article.
54. See supra note 37.
11
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And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts."55
Erie exemplified two policy objectives that would come to be
known as the twin aims of Erie.56 First, in removing the power
to create general common law from the federal courts, the Court
rectified the forum-shopping problem demonstrated by cases
like Black & White. Second, Erie also sought to increase parity
between federal courts sitting in diversity in a forum state and
courts of that forum state. 57
B. Federal Common Law After Erie
While Erie prevented federal courts from making general
federal common law, it did not proscribe the use of federal com-
mon law altogether. 58 On the same day the Court decided Erie,
Justice Brandeis wrote another majority opinion using federal
common law to decide an interstate boundary dispute between
two states.5 9 The rules for deciding such a dispute are found
neither in the Constitution nor in an act of Congress. Some
cases, therefore, require "[T]he Court, of necessity, [to] .. .de-
velop[] its own body of law to govern such questions, because of
the obvious unsuitability of looking to the law of a particular
state when two states are in dispute."60
Necessity aside, federal common law potentially exists in
all areas of federal competence. This is what former Circuit
55. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
56. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) ("the twin aims of the Erie
rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administra-
tion of the laws"); see also, John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 Am. U.
L. REV. 1087, 1124 (1992).
57. See DOERNBERG & WINGATE, supra note 41, at 14.
58. The difference is critical. Erie only proscribed the creation or use of gen-
eral federal common law. In my Civil Procedure class, a student answered my
professor's inquiry as to the holding in Erie with: "The Court said there is no fed-
eral common law." For dramatic effect, my professor banged his head repeatedly
against the blackboard until the student corrected the earlier statement.
59. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938) (Brandeis, J.) ("[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be appor-
tioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.") (citations
omitted).
60. WRIGHT, supra note 53, at 411.
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Judge Friendly referred to as "specialized common law."6 1 Be-
cause creating such common law would be within the scope of
federal powers, its creation and use would not violate the feder-
alism principles exemplified by Erie. Federal courts continued
making federal common law under the authority of the Consti-
tution and federal statutes. As Justice Jackson noted in 1942:
Federal law is no juridicial chameleon, changing complexion
to match that of each state wherein lawsuits happen to be com-
menced because of the accidents of service of process and of the
application of the venue statutes. It is found in the federal Con-
stitution, statutes, or common law. Federal common law imple-
ments the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by
them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the
traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon
all the sources of the common law in cases . ... 62
Although Justice Jackson's thoughts reflect the vitality of fed-
eral common law at the time, they were not expressly stated by
the Court; Justice Jackson's comments were made in concur-
rence. It was not until 1943 in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States63 that the Court explicitly enunciated the modern view
on the proper usage of federal common law.
In Clearfield Trust, the Court held that federal common
law governed the rights and duties of the United States on the
commercial paper it issued, despite the Erie decision.64 An un-
known party removed a government check issued to a federal
worker from the mail and used it to purchase merchandise at a
department store.65 Clearfield Trust, the department store's
collection company, guaranteed the check and forwarded it to
61. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964) ("The clarion yet careful pronouncement in
Erie, 'There is no federal general common law,' opened the door for what, for want
of a better term, we may call specialized federal common law.") (footnote omitted).
62. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72
(1942) (Jackson, J. concurring).
63. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
64. Id. at 366 ("[TIhe rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins does not apply to this
action. The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it
issues are governed by federal rather than local law.") (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 364-65. Aside from its federal common law rule, Clearfield Trust is
interesting because the United States government litigated the negligent payment
of a check up through the United States Supreme Court. Ironically, the check was




the Federal Reserve Bank for payment.66 When the Federal Re-
serve Bank discovered that the check was not properly payable,
the United States sued Clearfield Trust for reimbursement in
Pennsylvania federal district court.67 Clearfield Trust argued
that Erie required the case to be decided under Pennsylvania
law, barring recovery because the United States delayed signifi-
cantly before giving notice of the forgery to Clearfield Trust.
The United States argued that under United States v. National
Exchange Bank,68 a case decided under the regime of Swift v.
Tyson, the notification delay would not extinguish the remedy.
In adopting the federal common law created under Swift,69
the Court cited the need for national uniformity in adjudicating
such matters:
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on
a vast scale and .. .will commonly occur in several states. The
application of state law ... would subject the rights and duties of
the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to
great diversity in results by making identical transactions subject
to the vagaries of the laws of the several states.70
The Court used federal common law to decide the case, holding
that the government's delay did not extinguish the reimburse-
ment remedy.7 1
Clearfield Trust differed from Erie in a number of ways.
While Erie dealt with substantive tort law, an area generally
considered within the authority of state power, the issuance of
commercial paper in Clearfield Trust clearly qualified as a valid
exercise of federal power.7 2 Because the rights and duties of the
United States on its commercial paper are governed by federal
66. Id. at 365.
67. Id.
68. 214 U.S. 302 (1909).
69. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367 ("And while the federal law merchant,
developed for about a century under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, represented gen-
eral commercial law rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to protect a
federal right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for fashion-
ing federal rules applicable to these federal questions.") (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 367.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 366 ("When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts,
it is exercising a constitutional function or power."); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
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law, subsequent cases would produce the same result regard-
less of whether they were filed in state or federal court. Since
Clearfield Trust, the Court has decided a range of cases in
which creation of common law would be a valid exercise of fed-
eral power.73
C. Federal Common Law and Separation of Powers
In addition to the federalism principles embodied by Erie,
creation of common law by the federal courts raises separation
of powers concerns. Some scholars have interpreted the Erie
decision itself to exemplify these concerns. This interpretation
is popularly referred to as the New Erie Doctrine:
Some scholars have read Justice Brandeis' language in Erie
as stressing separation of powers between branches of the federal
government. In Erie, Justice Brandies rejected decades of federal
common law in diversity cases in areas outside the scope of fed-
eral competence. New Erie scholars believe it is inappropriate for
federal courts to create common law even within the scope of fed-
eral competence. 74
While the New Erie Doctrine is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle, the separation of powers concerns it raises are not. Such
concerns are prevalent throughout the Supreme Court's federal
common law jurisprudence. This article focuses on what Judge
Friendly termed spontaneous generation 75-or creating a fed-
eral rule as the rule of decision.7 6 There are two other areas in
which federal courts create common law that causes significant
separation of powers problems: when the federal judiciary ei-
ther (1) interprets a jurisdictional grant as a command to make
common law or (2) creates a private right of action in further-
ance of Congressional intent.
Creation of common law upon a jurisdictional grant is best
exemplified by the Court's 1957 decision in Textile Workers
73. In furtherance of areas of federal competence, Judge Friendly described
federal common law as a valuable tool: "It has employed a variety of techniques-
spontaneous generation . . . implication of a private federal cause of action . ..
construing a jurisdictional grant as a command to fashion federal law, and the
normal judicial filling of statutory interstices." Friendly, supra note 61, at 421.
74. DOERNBERG & WINGATE, supra note 41, at 334 n.3.
75. Friendly, supra note 61.




Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama.77 In that case,
the Court construed a jurisdictional grant of power from Con-
gress to hear collective bargaining disputes as a direction to cre-
ate federal common law. Although section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act provided no substantive rules for
decision in such labor disputes, the Court coupled the jurisdic-
tional grant with federal competence in the area of labor rela-
tions and created federal common law:
It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law
where federal rights are concerned .... Congress has indicated by
§ 301 (a) the purpose to follow that course here. There is no consti-
tutional difficulty. Article III, § 2, extends the judicial power to
cases "arising under ... the Laws of the United States . . . ." The
power of Congress to regulate these labor-management controver-
sies under the Commerce Clause is plain .... A case or contro-
versy arising under § 301(a) is, therefore, one within the purview
of judicial power as defined in Article 111.78
Justice Frankfurter dissented in Lincoln Mills. He likened the
case to Marbury v. Madison,79 a case in which the Supreme
Court refused a grant of authority from Congress because of the
non-judicial nature of the task.80 Justice Frankfurter concluded
by stating the majority's holding violated the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers because creating common law here would be ex-
tra-judicial in nature:
Solicitude and respect for the confines of "judicial power," and the
difficult problem of marking those confines, apply equally in con-
struing precisely what duties Congress has cast upon the federal
courts, especially when, as in this case, the most that can be said
in support of finding a congressional desire to impose these "legis-
lative" duties on the federal courts is that Congress did not men-
tion the problem in the statute and that, insofar as purpose may
be gathered from congressional reports and debates, they leave us
in the dark.81
Lincoln Mills represents perhaps the most liberal approach the
Court has taken to creating common law.
77. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
78. Id. at 457 (citing Clearfield Trust v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67
(1943)).
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
80. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 484 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 465 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Separation of powers concerns are also raised when the fed-
eral judiciary implies a federal private right of action when
Congress or the Constitution has not created one. The most no-
table case in which the Court has done so is Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcoticss2 in
1971. In Bivens, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
contained an implied private right of action allowing the victim
of an illegal search to sue the United States.8 3 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, noted that state law protections
against trespass or illegal search may not fully compensate or
protect Fourth Amendment interests.8 4 Justice Brennan con-
cluded that, because Congress neither provided an adequate
remedy nor indicated that the Court should not do so, implying
a private right of action was an appropriate step.8 5
A similar case was Cannon v. University of Chicago.8 6 In
Cannon, the petitioner brought suit against the University of
Chicago claiming its admission policy was discriminatory
against women, thereby violating the anti-discrimination provi-
sions of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.87 Title
IX proscribed discrimination in admissions decisions based on
sex for institutions receiving federal funding.88 Although Title
IX contained an administrative remedy,8 9 it contained no provi-
sion allowing a private right of action.90 Nonetheless, the Court
82. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
83. See id. at 397.
84. Id. at 395 (Brennan, J.) ("For just as state law may not authorize federal
agents to violate the Fourth Amendment, neither may state law undertake to limit
the extent to which federal authority can be exercised. The inevitable consequence
of this dual limitation on state power is that the federal question becomes not
merely a possible defense to the state law action, but an independent claim both
necessary and sufficient to make out the plaintiffs cause of action.") (citations
omitted).
85. Id. at 395-96.
86. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
87. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2001).
88. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2001) ("No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance .... ).
89. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2001) (allowing withdrawal of federal funds from
any institution not complying with the federal non-discrimination provisions).




relied on precedent interpreting analogous statutes to create a
cause of action. 91
Justice Powell dissented in Cannon, arguing that the doc-
trine of separation of powers should prevent the Court from cre-
ating such remedies in most circumstances. According to
Justice Powell, creation of implied rights of action would enable
Congress to let the courts determine if a private right of action
should exist. "Rather than confronting the hard political
choices involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its constitu-
tional obligation and leave the issue to the courts to decide."
92
Also, Justice Powell disapproved of this technique because
when federal courts, as counter-majoritarian institutions, cre-
ate legislative remedies "the public generally is denied the ben-
efits that are derived from the making of important societal
choices through the open debate of the democratic process." 93
Ultimately, Justice Powell's views would be adopted by the
court in a series of decisions refusing to create a private right of
action. 94 Justice Powell's reluctance to act in the face of Con-
gressional silence would become deeply entrenched in the
Court's federal common law jurisprudence over the next two de-
cades. Since the Court decided Cannon in 1979, the doctrines of
judicial restraint embodied in Justice Powell's concurrence have
also influenced decisions like Semtek dealing with spontaneous
generation of federal common law.
III. EVOLUTION OF TESTS USED BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN CREATING FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Spontaneous generation of federal common law has under-
gone several changes in the sixty years since the Court decided
91. Id.
92. Id. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that Title VI
contained no implied private right of action to enjoin state discrimination where
Title VI did not expressly address disparate-impact discrimination and an alter-
nate remedial scheme existed); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (holding
that improper discontinuance of federal disability benefits did not give rise to an
implied private right of action where Congress had enacted an alternate remedial
scheme); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (holding the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899 did not benefit any one class of people and therefore should
not be construed as containing an implied private right of action).
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Erie. In addition to the heightened emphasis on federalism
principles, separation of powers concerns permeate modern fed-
eral common law jurisprudence. A relaxed view toward the cre-
ation of federal common law minimizes the law-making powers
of both Congress and the States. Therefore, federal courts must
tread carefully between the jurisprudential Scylla and Charyb-
dis when contemplating creating common law. 95
As a result of Erie, a federal court sitting in diversity must
use state law to decide the substantive issues in a case. Thus,
adoption of federal common law necessitates the displacement
of state law.96 A court must utilize a two part-test in determin-
ing whether it is appropriate to create federal common law.97
First, the subject matter of the proposed common law must be
within the scope of federal competence; common law outside the
scope of federal competence is not a valid exercise of federal
power.98
The second step deals with the content of the federal com-
mon law. Once a court finds federal competence and decides
that federal law will control the case, it must decide between
two available options. First, a court may decide to adopt ex-
isting state law as the federal rule of decision. 99 When a court
decides to adopt state law as the federal rule of decision, the
outcome of the case is still controlled by federal law; a court can
depart from prior cases adopting state law as the federal rule of
decision when state law becomes inconsistent with federal pol-
icy interests.
95. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 189-201 (E.V. Rieu, trans., Penguin Books 1946)
(describing the narrow safe path between Scylla, a dangerous monster, and Cha-
rybdis, a perilous whirlpool). Much like the creation of federal common law, Scylla
and Charybdis allowed only a narrow path on which one could maneuver.
96. For purposes of clarity, this article refers to the creation or use of federal
common law as the displacement of state law. This distinction will help distin-
guish cases when the court creates federal common law and adopts state law as the
federal rule of decision from cases that refuse to adopt federal common law and
simply use state law to decide the case.
97. See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Com-
mon Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 883, 885-87 (1986).
98. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979). This is the




For example, in Semtek, the unanimous Court adopted Cal-
ifornia claim-preclusion law as the effect of a dismissal on stat-
ute of limitations grounds of a federal court sitting in
diversity. 100 State law did not conflict with any federal policy
interests. 101 The Court recognized that federal common law
with content referencing state law could only persevere as long
as it did not compromise federal interests. 10 2 To demonstrate
such a conflict, the Court stated that, if state law was inconsis-
tent with the penalties assessed for willful violations of discov-
ery orders outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"federal courts' interest in the integrity of their own processes
might justify a contrary federal rule."0 3
Second, a federal court may decide to fashion a new federal
rule rather than adopt state law as the content of federal com-
mon law. There are a number of reasons why a federal court
might choose to fashion a new federal rule. First, adoption of
state law may be inappropriate because of the many variations
between the substantive law of the several states. Second, the
adoption of state law might be inconsistent with federal policy
interests.10 4
The tension between the two choices before a federal court
faced with a choice-of-law decision goes to the essence of feder-
alism. Adopting state law as the federal rule of decision rather
than creating new rules of federal common law clearly values
the substantive state law as conclusive when Congress is silent.
Aside from the federalism conflict, federal courts are faced with
separation of powers concerns. The extent to which a federal
court should create federal common law when Congress has not
100. Semtek Int'l. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
101. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509 ("No such conflict with potential federal inter-
ests exists in the present case. Dismissal of this state cause of action was decreed
by the California federal court only because the California statute of limitations so
required; and there is no conceivable federal interest in giving that time bar more
effect in other courts than the California courts themselves would impose."). This
concept is more fully explored in the text accompanying notes 134-41, infra.
102. Id. ("This federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situ-
ations in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests.").
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs., Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (refusing to
use substantive Virginia tort law in a cause of action against a military contractor
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addressed the subject matter of the underlying dispute is ques-
tionable. 10 5 Federal courts are faced with the proverbial double-
edged sword when deciding whether or not to fashion a new rule
of federal common law.10 6
To facilitate a choice-of-law decision amidst these conflict-
ing tensions, the Supreme Court has laid out two different stan-
dards for the displacement of state law and the creation of
federal common law. Unfortunately, these tests seem to contain
inherently contradictory principles, yielding cases with a wide
variety of results. The three-factor test, exemplified by cases
such as United States v. Kimbell Foods,0 7 focuses on whether
state law is compatible with federal interests as a precursor for
the displacement of state law. 08 The significant conflict test,
exemplified by cases such as Boyle v. United Technologies'0 9 and
Atherton v. FDIC,1° places much more emphasis on state law,
holding that state law should only be displaced when there is a
significant conflict between federal policy interests and the op-
eration of state law."'
A. The Three-Factor Test in Kimbell Foods
The three-factor test stresses the importance of federal law
governing federal areas of competence. Although this means
that state law may be more easily displaced and federal com-
mon law will govern the outcome of the case, courts applying
this test are more likely to adopt state law as the federal rule of
decision. The three-factor test recognizes that, while federal
common law should govern in areas involving important federal
interests, state law is not always incompatible with furthering
the federal interests in question. The case that best exemplifies
application of the three-factor test is Kimbell Foods.
105. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
106. For an extended discussion of the tension between federalism and sepa-
ration of powers and its effect on the operation of federal courts, see generally DON-
ALD L. DOERNBERG, IDENTITY CRISIS: FEDERAL COURTS IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL
WILDERNESS (2001).
107. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
108. See infra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
109. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
110. 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
111. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
In Kimbell Foods, the Court examined the priority of fed-
eral liens held by bankrupt debtors. The debtors in question
had both federal government loans (Small Business Adminis-
tration and Farmer's Home Administration loans) and loans
from private creditors. The United States sought a ruling
granting priority on liens assessed through the federal pro-
grams. The law of the creditors' states (here, Texas and Geor-
gia) granted priority to the first-perfected lien. The United
States argued that the collection of federal liens, much like the
collection of federal taxes, must be administered by a set of uni-
form rules rather than being subjected to the varying commer-
cial statutes of the several states. Further, the public fisc would
be placed in jeopardy because it would be significantly less
likely that the United States would collect repayment on many
of the outstanding loans. 112
The Court found federal common law applied, but adopted
state law as the federal rule of decision. 1 3 The Court rejected
the United States' contention that the federal loan programs
needed a uniform rule, noting: "[as] a quasi-commercial lender,
[the Government] does not require ... the special priority which
it compels as sovereign in its tax-collecting capacity."" 4 Fur-
ther, Texas and Georgia were among the forty-nine states that
had adopted Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, so an
almost-uniform rule existed among the several states. Moreo-
ver, the agencies in question devoted substantial individual at-
tention to each debtor. When coupled with the detrimental
effect a mandatory prioritized federal lien would have on pri-
vate creditors, the need for a uniform federal rule proved
slight. 15 The Court used federal common law to decide the case
by adopting state law as the federal rule of decision rather than
fashioning a new rule to decide the case.
112. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 735-37.
113. Id. at 740 ("[A]bsent a congressional directive, the relative priority of pri-
vate liens and consensual liens arising from these Government lending programs
is to be determined under nondiscriminatory state laws.").
114. Id. at 737-38.
115. Id. at 737 ("Both agencies have promulgated exhaustive instructions to
ensure that loan recipients are financially reliable and to prevent improvident
loans. The Government therefore is in substantially the same position as private
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The Kimbell Foods Court used the three-factor test to
weigh the interests involved in choosing the content of the fed-
eral rule of decision. 116 First, a court must examine whether the
operation of the federal program necessitates uniform federal
rules. Second, a court must determine if application of state
law would frustrate the specific objectives of the federal pro-
gram. Finally, a court must consider the extent to which appli-
cation of a uniform federal rule would undermine transactions
made upon state law.
The first and second factors recognize the existence of some
federal interests (including the various federal programs) that
require a uniform federal rule for their success. For example,
the Court held in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino"7 that
foreign relations issues must be decided under a uniform body
of federal law. In Sabbatino, sugar purchased in Cuba was
seized by the Cuban government before it could be delivered to
the American buyer. The Court rejected the claim that Erie
mandated New York law be used to decide this diversity case,
holding that the federal foreign relations policy at issue must be
applied to ensure a uniform national approach in areas of for-
eign policy. 18
However, it does not follow that all federal programs re-
quire the application of a uniform federal law to operate. Aside
from Kimbell Foods, the Court has refused to create a uniform
federal law to further federal programs on numerous other occa-
sions. For example, Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Ass'n v. Parnell"9 involved an action between private parties
concerning, among other things, whether or not stolen United
States bonds were overdue. While Clearfield Trust held that
the rights and duties of the United States on its commercial pa-
per were governed by federal law, the Court held the federal
issue in this case was insignificant and would be properly han-
116. Id. at 728-29.
117. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
118. Id. at 425 ("However, we are constrained to make it clear that an issue
concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judici-
ary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members
of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal
law. It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have [this] in mind when it
decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).




dled under state law. 120  Similarly, in Miree v. DeKalb
County,121 the Court held that the federal interest in controlling
the use of national airspace did not necessitate a uniform fed-
eral rule where the underlying dispute was between private
parties, and the rights of the United States would be only mar-
ginally affected, if at all.122
The third factor weighs the extent to which application of a
uniform federal rule would undermine transactions made upon
state law. This factor is best exemplified by cases like Kimbell
Foods, where the Court held that application of a uniform fed-
eral rule would contravene the reasonable expectations of the
bankrupt debtors' other creditors. 23 An analogous example is
United States v. Yazell, 24 where recovery of a Small Business
Administration loan was before the Court. While Texas law
prevented a married woman's separate assets from being seized
to satisfy an outstanding debt, there was no federal statute
preventing such a seizure. Although the loan was made pursu-
ant to a federal program, the Court used Texas law to decide the
case. The Court found no pressing need for a uniform federal
rule because, as in Kimbell Foods, the Small Business Adminis-
tration spent a good deal of time working out the loan details
with each individual debtor and could allow for the operation of
the law of the debtor's state. 125
120. Id. at 33-34 ("The only possible interest of the United States in a situa-
tion like the one here, exclusively involving the transfer of Government paper be-
tween private persons, is that the floating of securities of the United States might
somehow or other be adversely affected by the local rule of a particular State re-
garding the liability of a converter. This is far too speculative, far too remote a
possibility to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of
local concern.").
121. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
122. Id. at 30. But cf. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.
1974) (refusing to use state law of negligence because regulation of national air-
space was an important federal interest).
123. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
124. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
125. Id. at 353 ("Clearly, in the case of these SBA loans there is no 'federal
interest' which justifies invading the peculiarly local jurisdiction of these States, in
disregard of their laws, and of the subtleties reflected by the differences in the laws
of the various States which generally reflect important and carefully evolved state
arrangements designed to serve multiple purposes.").
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B. The Significant Conflict Test
Unlike the three-factor test used in Kimbell Foods, the sig-
nificant conflict test requires federal courts to further scrutinize
the disparities between federal and state law before displacing
the latter in favor of the former. Application of this test results
in state law being displaced in notably fewer cases: "[In] a few
areas involving 'uniquely federal interests,'. . . state law is pre-
empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a con-
tent prescribed ... by the courts."126 Aside from requiring the
case to fall within the narrow scope of "uniquely federal inter-
ests," the significant conflict test requires that state law in
question be substantially incompatible with those federal inter-
ests. Specifically, "[d]isplacement will occur only where . . . a
significant conflict exists between an identifiable federal policy
or interest and the [operation] of state law, or the application of
state law would frustrate specific objectives of federal legisla-
tion."127 Such an approach severely limits the number of cases
in which federal courts can displace state law in favor of federal
common law, even if they would ultimately adopt state law as
the content of the federal common law. Courts applying this
test must first find either (1) a conflict between an identifiable
policy interest and operation of state law or (2) that application
of state law would frustrate specific objectives of federal
legislation.
An example of a case satisfying the significant conflict test
is Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. Boyle was a federal diver-
sity action involving the wrongful death of a Marine helicopter
pilot killed when his aircraft crashed during a training exercise.
The action alleged negligent design of the aircraft by United
Technologies, the military contractor who sold the helicopter to
the armed forces. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted
that adontino stt law ans t.h fderal rule of decision sianifi-
cantly conflicted with federal policy considerations because sub-
jecting military contractors to tort liability would have a direct,
undesirable financial effect on the United States. 128 Since the
126. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1987) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
127. Id. at 507 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 507 ("The imposition of liability on Government contractors will




significant conflict prerequisite had been met, the Court af-
firmed the federal common law rule of immunity for military
contractors created by the Fourth Circuit. 129
In contrast, a case where the Court was unable to find a
significant conflict between application of state law and a fed-
eral policy interest is Atherton v. FDIC.130 Atherton dealt with
the standard of care with which a federally-insured bank's
board of directors must execute transactions and loans. State
law provided for actions in simple negligence, gross negligence,
and breach of fiduciary duty. Federal statutes allowed for gross
negligence but did not preempt state claims. FDIC sought crea-
tion of a uniform common law rule mandating a minimum stan-
dard of care for officers of federally-chartered banks. The Court
rejected FDIC's argument, finding it unnecessary that feder-
ally-chartered bank officers be subject to the same set of duties
nationwide. 131 Federally-chartered banks have always been
subject to the laws of the states in which they do business. 132
Therefore, a significant conflict between the application of state
law and a federal policy interest did not exist. In the end, the
Court held that state law should not be displaced unless it was
less inclusive in defining gross negligence. 133
IV. DID THE COURT ABANDON THE SIGNIFICANT
CONFLICT TEST IN DECIDING SEMTEK?
In finding that the integrity of federal diversity judgments
depended upon a uniform national rule for their enforcement, 34
to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its price.
Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly affected."); see also
id. at 512 ("In sum, we are of the view that state law which holds Government
contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some circum-
stances present a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be displaced.").
129. Id. at 514.
130. 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
131. Id. at 221.
132. Id. at 223 (noting that the days when federally-chartered banks would
have to defend themselves from state tax collectors are long past). Compare Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
133. Id. at 227.
134. Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001)
("[W]e have long held that States cannot give those judgments merely whatever
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Semtek held that federal common law governed the claim-
preclusive effect of federal judgments. 135 Further, the Court
found that national uniformity would be best served by allowing
state law to determine the claim-preclusive effect of a federal
diversity dismissal. 136 By adopting state law as the federal rule
of decision, the claim-preclusive effect of a statute of limitations
dismissal would be the same in a federal court sitting in diver-
sity as in a court of the state in which that federal court sits. 37
Such a decision was desirable because it so perfectly reflected
the principles of the Erie doctrine. 138
However, the Semtek Court's reasoning represents a clear
departure from the significant conflict test exemplified by cases
like Boyle and Atherton. Semtek presented a situation where
there was no significant conflict between the application of state
law and a significant federal policy interest. Because Semtek
involved a federal court sitting in diversity, Erie mandated that
the court use California substantive law. The Court has held
that statute of limitations periods are within the realm of sub-
stantive law for Erie choice-of-law decisions. 39 Also, while the
Court recognized that a uniform rule regarding the claim-
preclusive effect of federal diversity dismissals was an impor-
tant federal policy interest, it found that the federal interest
was actually augmented by adopting state law as the federal
rule of decision: "nationwide uniformity in the substance of the
matter is better served by having the same claim-preclusive rule
(the state rule) apply whether dismissal has been ordered by a
state or federal court." 40 While the Court cautioned that this
135. Id. at 508 ("In [a previous case] the State was allowed (indeed, required)
to give a federal diversity judgment no more effect than it would accord one of its
own judgments only because reference to state law was the federal rule that this
Court deemed appropriate. In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclu-
sive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity.").
136. Id. ("Since state, rather than federal, substantive law is at issue there is
no need for a uniform federal rule. And indeed, nationwide uniformity in the sub-
stance of the matter is better served by having the same claim-preclusive rule (the
state rule) apply whether dismissal has been ordered by a state or federal court.").
137. Id. ("This is, it seems to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally
prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by State courts in which
the federal diversity court sits.").
138. See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
139. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
140. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added). In this context, applying the




adoption of state law would change if state law became incom-
patible with the integrity of federal diversity dismissals,' 4 ' such
a situation did not exist when Semtek was decided. Thus, the
case completely lacked any significant conflict between applica-
tion of state law and an important federal policy interest.
Rather than applying the significant conflict test, the
Semtek Court used considerations similar to the three-factor
test used in Kimbell Foods.142 Although Semtek did not cite
Kimbell Foods, the three factors are easily recognizable in the
Court's decision. First, the Court evaluated whether or not the
federal program necessitated uniform federal rules, concluding
that the integrity of federal judgments required a uniform rule
created by the Supreme Court.143 Second, the Court found that
application of state law would not frustrate the integrity of fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity: "any other rule [than the state
rule] would produce the sort of 'forum-shopping . . .and ...
inequitable administration of the laws' that Erie sought to
avoid, since filing in, or removing to, federal court could be en-
couraged by the divergent effects that the litigants would antici-
pate from likely grounds of dismissal." 144 Finally, the Court
considered the third Kimbell Foods factor, dealing with the dis-
ruption of transactions predicated on state law that would occur
if a new rule of federal common law were to be fashioned. Al-
though Semtek did not involve the type of commercial transac-
tions in question in Kimbell Foods, the Court examined the
reasonable procedural assumptions parties entering litigation
would have about the claim-preclusive effect of a federal court
diversity dismissal. After Erie and its progeny, litigants should
expect a federal court sitting in diversity to apply the substan-
tive law of the state in which it sits. 45 Adoption of a new fed-
federal court is sitting. In this sense, the application of state law is the same,
although the content of the substantive law will vary among the several states.
141. Id. at 509. See also supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text accompanying note 116.
143. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 ("[E]ven when States are allowed to give federal
judgments (notably, judgments in diversity cases) no more than the effect accorded
to state judgments, that disposition is by direction of this Court, which has the last
word on the claim-preclusive effect of all federal judgments.").
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eral rule would disrupt the decades of jurisprudence since the
Court decided Erie.
It is odd that a unanimous Court created federal common
law in Semtek; considering that the Court required a significant
conflict between state law and a federal policy interest as late
as 1997 with Atherton.146 As discussed above, Semtek presented
a situation completely lacking such a conflict. Perhaps it is
even more striking that Justice Scalia wrote the Semtek opin-
ion; only fourteen years earlier, he wrote the majority opinion in
Boyle calling for a significant conflict before a court created
common law. 147 The approach used by the Semtek Court more
closely resembles the approach used in Kimbell Foods, where
the Court found that federal common law governed the case be-
cause federal loan programs were a significant national interest
but adopted state law as the federal rule of decision.
V. CONCLUSION
After Semtek, the precise future of the Supreme Court's
common law jurisprudence is uncertain. While Semtek repre-
sents a departure from the stricter standards of the significant
conflict test exemplified by cases like Boyle and Atherton, it is
unclear whether the decision represents a complete return to
the three-factor test of Kimbell Foods. Perhaps Semtek
presented a situation proponents of the significant conflict test
never anticipated; its facts squarely pitted Erie and its progeny
against the significant conflict test. However, it is clear that
the Court needed to decide Semtek as it did to clarify the mean-
ing of "on the merits" in Rule 41(b).1 48 Regardless of whether
the reasoning in Semtek is transient or permanent, two things
are certain. First, it is clear that the Court will continue to de-
cide federal common law cases with a watchful eye to both the
principles of federalism and separation of powers and years of
mismatched precedent. Second, it does not appear that the ju-
risprudence surrounding this body of law will become any
clearer, even to scholars. As one author described the study of
federal common law:. "It is clear that where the Constitution, or
146. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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a valid Act of Congress, provides a rule of decision, it must be
applied by a federal court - and by a state court - in cases
where there is concurrent jurisdiction. Beyond that very little
is clear."149
149. WRIGHT, supra note 53, at 412.
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